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Answering the title question requires explicating its meaning and then
examining the empirical evidence. The first task is begun in this
introductory Part I, which gives a rough account of the two groups whose
relation is to be queried: the world's poor and the "we" addressed in the
piece. Part II then proposes a specific understanding of what it means to
violate human rights. I will argue that a human rights violation involves
non-fulfillment of human rights as well as a specific causal relation of
human agents to such non-fulfillment. Importantly, this understanding of a
human rights violation includes not only interactional violations
(perpetrated directly by human agents) but also institutional violations
(caused by human agents through the imposition of institutional
arrangements). Based on the explication of the question in Parts I and II,
Part III goes on to consider some of the evidence relevant to answering the
question. This evidence favors the conclusion that there exists a
supranational institutional regime that foreseeably and avoidably produces
massive human rights deficits. By collaboratively imposing this
institutional scheme, we are indeed violating the human rights of the
world's poor.
Who, then, are the world's poor? Following the Universal Declaration,
t Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale University, Professorial
Fellow at the Australian National University Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics
(CAPPE), Adjunct Professor at the University of Central Lancashire, Research Director at the
Oslo University Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN) and a member of the
Norwegian Academy of Science. Having received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard,
Thomas Pogge has published widely on Kant and in moral and political philosophy. His most
recent book is POLITICS AS USUAL (2010). His current work is focused on a team effort toward
developing a complement to the pharmaceutical patent regime that would improve access to
advanced medicines for the poor worldwide (www.healthimpactfund.org). Professor Pogge is
grateful to Tienmu Ma, John Tasioulas, and Lynn Tong for many valuable comments and
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we might define a poor individual as one who does not have access "to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of
his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care."' This is a
vague definition, but it clearly includes a large percentage of the world's
population. In 2005, the median annual income was $465, which means
that half the world's people were living on less than $9 a week (the global
average weekly income was $66). This surely sounds like poverty, but one
must bear in mind that basic foodstuffs may cost in a poor country only
half, a third, or an even smaller fraction of what they cost in the United
States. So, depending on the prices of basic necessities in the various poor
countries, some in the poorer half may plausibly be said to enjoy (and some
in the top half to lack) an adequate standard of living. Still, such plausible
adjustments do not alter the fact that a large percentage of the world's
people lack the income necessary for basic survival and sustenance
according to the Universal Declaration's definition. This includes almost all
those who, in 2005, belonged to the poorest thirty percent of humanity and
thus lived on less than $4 a week. Even with substantially lower prices of
basic necessities, their standard of living cannot plausibly be deemed
adequate.2
By "we" I mean citizens of developed countries (e.g., the United States,
the European Union, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) who
have sufficient mental maturity, education, and political opportunities to
share responsibility for their government's foreign policy and for its role in
designing and imposing supranational institutional arrangements. This
definition takes for granted that the citizens of each of the included
countries share a collective responsibility for what their government does in
their name. This responsibility is not shared by all citizens, however.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, art. 25, U.N. Doc.
A/RES.217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
2. The data used in this paragraph were kindly supplied by Branko Milanovic of the
World Bank in a personal e-mail communication on April 25, 2010. He calculated the 2005
median as $465 per person per year and the thirtieth percentile as $211. E-mail from Branko
Milanovic, principal economist in the World Bank's Development Research Group, World
Bank (Apr. 25, 2010) (on file with author). Milanovic is the leading authority on the
measurement of inequality, and his published work contains similar albeit somewhat less
updated information. See generally Branko Milanovic, True World Income Distribution, 1988 and
1993: First Calculation Based on Household Surveys Alone, 112 ECON. J. 51, 51-92 (2002); BRANKO
MILANOVIC, WORLDS APART: MEASURING INTERNATIONAL AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2005);
BRANKO MILANOVIC, THE HAVES AND THE HAVE-NOTS: A BRIEF AND IDIOSYNCRATIC HISTORY OF
GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2011). Inequality and poverty data are usually adjusted according to
purchasing power parities (PPPs). I reject this practice as unjustified in the case of inequality
because it conflicts with revealed-preference data: affluent people who could easily move to
cheaper locations do not do so, and this shows that they get something of value in return for
the higher prices they pay for the goods and services they consume. In the case of poverty
measurement, a price adjustment is indeed appropriate. But the PPPs for individual
household consumption expenditure commonly used for this purpose are inappropriate here
because they reflect the prices of all the goods and services that households worldwide
consume and thereby give far too little weight to the prices of basic foodstuffs, which are
cheaper in poor countries but not as much cheaper as PPPs suggest. For detailed analysis, see
THOMAS POGGE, POLITICS AS USUAL: WHAT LIES BEHIND THE PRO-PooR RHETORIC 79-85, 213
n.127 (2010) [hereinafter POGGE, POLITICS AS USUAL].
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Children are clearly excluded, and so are people with serious mental
disabilities. I am not willing to go further and exclude additional citizens
on account of their low income or poor education. If poor or poorly
educated citizens recognize such a responsibility and act on it - much like
the vastly poorer and vastly less educated workers of Manchester did when
they risked their livelihoods to join the anti-slavery movement in 1787 -
then who has the standing to tell them that they are mistaken, that they
have no such responsibility and need not bother? On the other hand, I am
also not prepared to point the finger at a laid-off steel worker or struggling
single mother in today's United States, for example, and pass judgment on
whether she is failing to live up to her citizen responsibilities. 3 I can
suspend judgment about such cases because what matters is the judgment
each of us reaches about ourselves. I believe that I share responsibility for
what my country is doing in the name of its citizens, and I explain what
human rights deficits I hold myself co-responsible for, and why. You must
judge for yourself whether you find these reasons compelling or whether,
on reflection, you find yourself sufficiently immature, uneducated, or
impoverished to be exempt from the ordinary responsibilities of
citizenship.
II. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO VIOLATE A HUMAN RIGHT?
In this Part, I will elaborate on my understanding of what it means to
violate a human right. Human rights violations involve both the non-
fulfillment of a human right and a certain causal responsibility of human
agents for this non-fulfillment. These two aspects of human rights
violations are treated respectively in Sections A and C. Section B is a brief
interlude on the normativity of human rights: their relation to morality and
the law. Section D concludes Part II by discussing the concept of a human
rights violation emerging from the preceding sections.
A. Non-fulfillment
A particular human right of some particular person is unfulfilled when
this person lacks secure access to the object of that human right. This object
is whatever the human right is a right to: for example, freedom of
movement, equal political participation, basic education, or freedom from
assault. With regard to the human rights of the global poor, the most
immediately relevant human right is the one already cited in Part I: the
right to secure access to an adequate standard of living. But it is not the
only one. Those who lack secure access to an adequate standard of living
typically lack secure access to the objects of other human rights as well. For
example, many people are compelled by poverty to enter employment
3. This topic has been the subject of an exchange between Debra Satz and myself. See
Debra Satz, VWhat Do We Owe tihe Global Poor?, 19 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 47, 50-51 (2005); Thomas
Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties, 19 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 55, 80-83 (2005).
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relations in which they are subject to serious abuse by factory supervisors
or domestic employers. Many women are exposed to assault and rape
because they cannot afford to divorce their husband, cannot afford a secure
dwelling, or must fetch water from distant locations. Others are sold into
prostitution by their own relatives or fall prey to traffickers who abduct
them or promise them a living wage abroad. Most poor people are
vulnerable to humiliation, dispossession, or personal domination because
they lack the means to defend their legal rights.
What then is the normative significance of the empirical distinction
between fulfillment and non-fulfillment of a particular human right of a
particular person? By asserting a human right to some object, one is
making at least the following two claims. First, one is claiming that it is of
great importance that human beings should have secure access to this
object - that such secure access serves important interests of the right
holder or other human beings.4 Second, one is claiming that these
important interests justify some significant duties on the part of other
human agents to ensure that human beings actually have secure access to
the objects of their human rights. The second claim fails in cases where
security of access cannot be affected by human conduct: human beings
cannot, at present, ensure immortality or perfect memory, for instance.
And it also fails in cases where the counterpart obligations would be too
onerous in the world as we know it: much or all of the importance of the
interest in secure access to sexual intimacy is offset by the burdens that
assuring such secure access would place upon other human agents.
That a human right exists presupposes that the second claim can be
made good. But it does not follow that such counterpart obligations exist
whenever this human right is unfulfilled for any person. When a person is
without food or shelter far from any other human agent, her human right to
an adequate standard of living may be unfulfilled even while there are no
obligations on the part of others because none of them can reach her to
supply what she lacks. A similar conclusion seems compelling when a
person is without food or shelter in a social context where all other human
agents in a position to assist her are likewise desperately short of these
necessities. Here rendering assistance is too onerous to be required. But
such scenarios do not undermine the case for the existence of the human
right in question because it is not true across the board that there are never
any counterpart obligations. This world clearly is one in which, when
human beings lack access to a minimally adequate standard of living, there
typically are other human agents who can plausibly be deemed required to
help ensure secure access. It is also clearly of great importance that human
beings should have secure access to minimally adequate shares of basic
necessities such as food, clothing, housing, and medical care. And so the
human right asserted in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration is well
4. The freedom of speech and expression, for example, is important not merely to those
who would communicate, but also to all those who have such communications available to
them or gain when injustice and ill treatment are deterred by the fear of publicity.
4 [Vol. 14:2
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grounded even if its non-fulfillment does not trigger obligations in each
and every case.5
This same point can be made in terms of a distinction between duties
and obligations. Duties are general; obligations are specific. For example,
someone may have a general duty to keep her promises and a derivative
obligation to return a book to her colleague. A duty may generate
obligations only in certain circumstances: one's duty to keep one's promises
generates no obligations if one has made no promises, for instance; and
one's duty to give, when one reasonably can, food to hungry persons
generates no obligations when there are no hungry people or when one is
desperately short of food oneself. Though there is no obligation in these
situations, this does not defeat the assertion of the duty so long as this duty
does generate obligations in other situations that do or realistically can arise
in the world as we know it. By contrast, there is no duty to give others
immortality, because in our world no situations can arise in which such a
duty would generate a plausible obligation.
What, then, are the duties correlative to a human right and, more
specifically, correlative to the human right to a minimally adequate
standard of living? A good step toward answering this question involves
examining the respect-protect-fulfill triad that has become a staple of
international agency thinking in this area. This triad goes back to Henry
Shue's seminal book Basic Rights, which argues that each basic right gives
rise to three distinct correlative duties:
I. To avoid depriving
II. To protect from deprivation
1. By enforcing duty (I) and
2. By designing institutions that avoid the creation of strong
incentives to violate duty (I)
III. To aid the deprived
1. Who are one's special responsibility
2. Who are victims of social failures in the performance of
duties (I), (II-1), (11-2) and
3. Who are victims of natural disasters. 6
Inspired by this typology, Philip Alston and Asbjorn Eide popularized
the respect-protect-fulfill triad in the 1980s. 7 This triad was then carefully
elaborated in the famous General Comment 12, adopted in 1999 by the UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Article 15 of this
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, art. 25, U.N. Doc.
A/RES.217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
6. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 60 (2d
ed. 1996) (1980).
7. For their work and for their acknowledgement of Henry Shue's influence upon it, see,
e.g., Philip Alston, International Law and tihe Right to Food, in FOOD AS A HUMAN RIGHT 162, 169-
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General Comment reads as follows:
The right to adequate food, like any other human right,
imposes three types or levels of obligations on States parties: the
obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfill. In turn, the obligation
to fulfill incorporates both an obligation to facilitate and an
obligation to provide. The obligation to respect existing access to
adequate food requires States parties not to take any measures that
result in preventing such access. The obligation to protect requires
measures by the State to ensure that enterprises or individuals do
not deprive individuals of their access to adequate food. The
obligation to fulfill (facilitate) means the State must pro-actively
engage in activities intended to strengthen people's access to and
utilization of resources and means to ensure their livelihood,
including food security. Finally, whenever an individual or group
is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right to
adequate food by the means at their disposal, States have the
obligation to fulfill (provide) that right directly. This obligation also
applies for persons who are victims of natural or other disasters.8
These reflections largely accept two limitations that are widely taken
for granted in the world of international relations: namely that human
rights impose counterpart duties only on states and that the human rights
of any person normally impose counterpart duties only upon the state or
states under whose jurisdiction she falls either through physical presence or
through a legal bond of citizenship or residency.9 I highlight these
limitations because I will later question them along with the comfortable
belief they sustain: namely, that the unfulfilled human rights of
impoverished foreigners abroad impose human-rights-correlative
obligations only upon their respective governments and compatriots and
none upon ourselves.
B. Human Rights in Relation to Law and Morality
Since World War II, an impressive body of human rights law has
emerged both internationally and in many national jurisdictions. Those
who have been part of this process would concede that existing human
8. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, General Comment on The Right to
Adequate Food, art. 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1995) [hereinafter General
Comment 12], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/comments.htm
(follow "12 The Right to Adequate Food (art. 11)" hyperlink).
9. Most would probably be willing to add here that the human-rights-based obligations of
states also extend to any territories they attack, invade, or occupy and to the human beings
residing there. On this somewhat controversial extension, the state of Israel would be
responsible for the fulfillment of human rights in the Occupied Territories and the United
States would be responsible for the fulfillment of human rights in occupied Iraq, Afghanistan,
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rights law is neither complete nor perfect and remains to be ratified and
fully accepted in many places. Despite these acknowledged shortfalls, one
may sound arrogant when expressing a fundamental disagreement with the
existing understanding of human rights which plainly includes the two
limitations just highlighted - like a baseball player who, when told "three
strikes and you're out," replies that he disagrees with this rule.
Human rights are different from baseball rules and, indeed, from most
of national and international law. The difference is brought out by the fact
that human rights are not merely part of the law but also a moral standard
that all law ought to meet and a standard that is not yet met by much
existing law in many countries. Law has incorporated human rights in a
way that points beyond itself: to a normativity that does not depend on the
law for its existence and cannot be revised or repealed by legislative or
judicial fiat or by other law-making mechanisms such as treaties or
international custom. This point is articulated in the legal separation from
customary international law of ius cogens, a set of norms whose validity is
understood to transcend the discretion of states. Ius cogens is generally
taken to include at least norms prohibiting aggressive war, genocide,
slavery, torture, military aggression, and piracy.10 The point is also
prominently expressed in many legal documents, for instance in the very
first words of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which call for the
"recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family" (my emphases)." With this formulation,
echoed in frequent appeals to "internationally recognized human rights,"
governments present themselves as recognizing certain rights in law rather
than as creating these rights de novo. Their use of the word "inalienable"
reinforces this conclusion: an inalienable right is a right that its holders
cannot lose, not through anything they do themselves (waiver or
forfeiture), nor through anything others do, for instance through an
alteration of the law. National and international human rights law is then
remarkable not only for its content - the uncompromising insistence,
against all power and privilege, on the dignity of every human being - but
also for its self-restraint. Human rights law is not declaring itself the source
10. A similar and related instance of law pointing beyond itself is the legal distinction
between mala in se and mala prohibita. While there is disagreement about how exactly to draw
this distinction, there is near unanimous agreement that there are mala in se and, more
specifically, acts that are so wrong that any legal system is morally required to prohibit them.
The fact that some legal system permits acts of torture, rape, murder, or enslavement is not a
vindication of these acts but an indictment of that legal system. Insofar as a legal system fails
to recognize and to realize the independently existing rights of human beings, it is widely
thought to lose its authority, that is, its title to command and its power to create non-
prudential reasons for its addressees to support it and to comply with its rules. Thus, even if
the U.S. Supreme Court were to find that the executive did nothing wrong by delivering
people suspected of terrorist activities to Syria for torture, for example, such finding would
still leave open the pressing questions whether the Court interpreted existing law correctly
and, if so, whether the renditions permitted by the law were or were not violations of the
human right of the persons rendered.
11. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, pmbl., U.N. Doc.
A/ RES.217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
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of human rights, but, on the contrary, asserting that all human beings have
certain human rights regardless of whether these are recognized in their
jurisdiction or indeed anywhere at all. Human rights are set forth in the
law in a way that implies that these rights have an independent existence
and thus existed before they were codified and would continue to exist
even if governments were to withdraw their legal recognition.
Born of the horrendous abuse of the law in Nazi Germany, this self-
restraint of the law is a great advance in human civilization. Endorsing this
advance just because governments have endorsed it would miss the essence
of their endorsement. Governments have taken this step in a way that
clearly recognizes that it is right independent of their endorsement. They
have recognized that the Nazis, had they won the war, could not have
abolished human rights (though they could, of course, have systematically
violated them in their law and practice). The advance should be endorsed
in this spirit. The legal texts in which governments formulate human rights
and explicate their correlative duties do, of course, deserve close attention.
But when studying these texts one should also understand that they are
not, by their own self-conception, definitive. Whether there are human
rights, what human rights there are, and what duties these human rights
entail - these questions are not settled by the texts alone.
Because human rights law points beyond itself in this way, the question
of what duties human rights entail does not boil down to the question of
which such duties competent courts applying current law would recognize.
Both Shue and the authors of General Comment 12 approach the question
in this spirit and the remainder of this Article follows their example.
C. From Non-Fulfillment to Violation
What is the relationship between the non-fulfillment of a human right
and its violation? In order to answer this question, we must differentiate
the various kinds of causal pathways by which one human agent's conduct
may affect the fulfillment of a person's human rights. Four distinct
pathways are distinguished in General Comment 12. Reconstructing this
distinction without the artificial limitation to states, one can say that human
rights may give human agents four distinct kinds of duties: duties to respect
human rights, duties to protect (secure access to the objects of) human
rights, duties to provide (secure access to) the objects of human rights, and
duties to facilitate human rights fulfillment. My discussion of these four
duties will focus on cases where a breach of the duty counts as a human
rights violation. This sentence suggests that some breaches of human-
rights-correlative duties are not human rights violations. That this is so is
illustrated by cases of uninvolved bystanders who can protect or provide at
reasonable cost. They have a duty to do so but are not human rights
violators if they fail. Consider a rich Swede in 1830, who could have
bought slaves and set them free or could have sent money or food to
starving people in India. Many will say that he ought to have done this and
had a duty to do it. But few will say that, by doing nothing of this sort, he
8 [Vol. 14:2
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violated the human rights of those he failed to rescue. The latter judgment
is widely rejected in part for the unsound reason that the number of those
who needed rescuing far exceeded his capacity for rescue, which makes it
unclear whose human rights his failure violated. 12 The compelling reason
why the language of violation seems inappropriate here is that the Swede
was not responsible for, nor implicated in, the relevant human rights being
unfulfilled - he is in a position to help the starving and the enslaved, but
he himself played no role in their starvation or enslavement.13 Not every
case of a human right being unfulfilled is a case of this right being violated.
An unfulfilled human right manifests a human rights violation only if there
are one or more human agents who are bringing about the un-fulfillment of
the human right in question even while they could and should have known
that their conduct would have this result.
The most straightforward human rights violations involve breaches of
duties to respect, that is, duties "not to take any measures that result in
preventing" a human being from having secure access to the object of a
human right. As this negative formulation indicates, these are conceived as
negative duties: duties that can be honored by remaining passive and can
be breached only by taking action. So what actions should these duties
forbid? They should forbid any action that is reasonably avoidable and
foreseeably causes some human being to be prevented from enjoying secure
access to the object of a human right. This formulation requires at least two
clarifications. First, the expression "reasonably avoidable" may seem
redundant: if the agent could and should foresee that the contemplated
action would prevent a human being from having secure access to the
object of a human right, then (one might think) the agent can and ought to
avoid this effect. But there may be cases where refraining would allow the
occurrence of massive harms that only the contemplated action can avert.
And one might then formulate the duty so that it does not apply in such
cases on the ground that the agent cannot reasonably avoid the relevant
action. Second, the word "causes" should be read to include cases where
the preventing is effected indirectly, as when a commander orders his
soldiers to destroy a dam, thereby depriving peasants of the water they
need to irrigate their crops. If the soldiers obey and famine results, they as
well as their commanding officer have breached their duty to respect the
human rights of the affected population. It may not be plausible, however,
to count all such indirect cases as breaching a duty to respect. A military
junta may try to blackmail a journalist not to publish her story about the
12. This supposed problem can be solved if we say that, by doing nothing, he violated the
human rights of them all. This does not go against the ought-implies-can constraint provided
we add that, by helping as much as he was morally required to do, he extinguished the claims
on him even of those for whom he did nothing. This seems plausible to me: the defense "I
cannot help all" as addressed to a person one can but does not help is a good defense if and
only if one is actually giving to other persons as much help as one ought to give overall.
13. The Swede might have been implicated in, without being responsible for, the under-
fulfillment of human rights if he was a beneficiary of the wrongs that caused the enslavement
or starvation (if, for example, he inherited his fortune from his father who profited from
investments in the slave trade).
9
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junta's corruption by threatening that it will kill some of its political
prisoners if she goes ahead. In such a case, it would be unconvincing to say
that the journalist, if she publishes the story nonetheless (even while she
can foresee that the junta will implement its threat) is breaching her duty to
respect the political prisoners' human right to life. Here only the junta and
its henchmen are human rights violators, the journalist is not (which is not
to say that going ahead with the story is clearly the right decision in cases
of this sort).
Duties to protect and duties to provide are similar in that they both are
positive duties: duties that require active intervention in a situation and
that cannot be discharged by remaining passive. These duties apply to
agents like the earlier Swede, who was neither responsible for, nor
implicated in, the human rights deficits he found himself in a position to
diminish; and breaching duties of either kind does not then count as a
human rights violation. The two positive duties are distinguished by
reference to the type of threat that triggers them and by the mode of
intervention they require. Duties to protect are understood as requiring
human agents to take preventive action when the fulfillment of human rights
is endangered by social threats: by other human agents who are, perhaps
inadvertently, disposed to act in ways that render such access insecure.
The duty requires that one render the objects of human rights secure by
preventing either the potentially harmful actions or their potentially
harmful effects. Duties to provide are understood as requiring a different
response to social threats: not a blocking of the threat but a neutralizing of
its harmful effects. Duties of the two kinds are complementary in that one
becomes moot insofar as the other is discharged: if UN troops break the
siege of a city and thereby restore its usual food supply, then the obligation
to provide food to the city's population dissolves; and, conversely, if the
UN provides food to the city's people, it staves off the human-rights-based
obligation to break the siege of the city in order to protect its people from
being separated from their food supplies. 14
Duties to respond to natural disasters that threaten the fulfillment of
human rights are generally classified as duties to provide. Exemplified in
human rights documents (including General Comment 12), this is an
unfortunate practice because it obscures the fact that, as in the case of social
threats, the task can be discharged in two fundamentally different ways: by
preventing the harm from reaching people or by assisting people in coping
with it. The common label tends to draw attention to the latter approach;
14. In such cases of complementarity, it makes sense to choose the less costly option. In
most cases, however, successful efforts to provide are inferior substitutes for successful efforts
to protect. While the siege is going on, the residents of the city are unlikely to have secure
access to the objects of their human rights, even if food is being airlifted by the UN. Similarly,
providing medical supplies to people subject to military aggression can only reduce the
human rights deficit, while deterring or blocking the aggression might avoid this deficit
altogether. In some cases, the conceptual boundary between the two duties is unclear. Thus, if
the rulers of a country are unable or unwilling to maintain an orderly police force that ensures
citizens' physical security, and if UN troops then take on this function, these UN soldiers could
be said to protect citizens from criminal violence or alternatively to provide the missing security.
10 [Vol. 14:2
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and nearly all international efforts to cope with natural disasters are indeed
focused on assistance ex post rather than on (often more cost-effective)
prevention ex ante. A good step toward correcting this irrational bias
would be to break out duties to protect human beings from natural
disasters as a separate category of human-rights-correlative duties.
Given that they are positive duties, duties to protect and to provide are
largely irrelevant to the topic of human rights violations (as I have
proposed to define them). Yet two further points should be made about
them here. First, those who prevent effective conduct pursuant to a duty to
protect or to provide typically breach a duty to respect and can then be
labeled human rights violators. For example, those who ordered General
Romeo Dallaire not to confiscate the weapons that the Interahamwe militias
were assembling in Kigali, Rwanda, in preparation for the 1994 genocide
were breaching their duty to respect human rights, provided they could
and should have known that Dallaire had an essentially correct assessment
of what these weapons were intended to be used for.15 By preventing the
action Dallaire was about to undertake, they were actively intervening in the
situation in a way that would foreseeably lead to the reasonably avoidable
slaughter of hundreds of thousands of innocent people.
Second, even a failure to protect or provide can constitute a human
rights violation in cases where the agent has assumed a special role that
involves protecting or providing (secure access to) objects of human rights.
For example, when a police officer remains passive when he sees a wild
teenager beat up a homeless woman nearby, he is not merely breaching his
duty to protect (as a civilian bystander might), but also his duty to respect
human rights. He is breaching a negative duty: the duty not to assume an
office and then fail to perform its associated tasks. This is analogous to the
case of promising discussed above, where the duty not to break one's
promises, although it is negative because it can be discharged by remaining
passive, may nonetheless generate positive obligations (e.g., to return a
book one had promised to return). One has the option of remaining
passive, never to become a promisor, which brings one into easy
compliance with the negative duty. But once one actively assumes the role
of promisor, then one's duty not to break one's promise may require further
action (if such was promised). Likewise with the roles of police officer,
lifeguard, physician, and the like: one is violating human rights when one
undertakes to occupy such a role and then fails to meet its requirements in
a way that foreseeably and avoidably renders insecure the access others
have to the objects of their relevant human rights. These points are unlikely
to be controversial in cases where the role occupant's failure to take
appropriate action to safeguard a human right breaches the requirements of
his role as officially specified (perhaps in a legal document that he had
signed when he took on the job). These points become more controversial
when the role definitions are unjustly specified, for example, when role
occupants are not legally required to - or even legally required not to -
15. See POGGE, POLITICS AS USUAL, supra note 2, at 168-69.
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protect or assist people of a certain color, religion, or political persuasion.
Is a "for whites only" lifeguard (like all other competent swimmers on the
beach) breaching only a positive duty when he lets a black child drown, or
is he in addition (unlike other competent swimmers) also breaching a
negative duty to respect? It will be easier to think about this question after
reflecting on duties to facilitate.
In explication of duties to facilitate, General Comment 12 prescribes
that "the State must pro-actively engage in activities intended to strengthen
people's access to and utilization of resources and means to ensure their
livelihood, including food security." 16 Transcending the respect-protect-
fulfill triad, the authors of General Comment 12 clearly conceived of duties
to facilitate as distinct from duties to provide and also as important enough
to be broken out as a separate category. Why? Posting lifeguards and
instructing them to rescue all swimmers in trouble, maintaining homeless
shelters that also serve nutritious meals, underwriting basic medical
services for poor people - all such state activities could easily be classed as
duties to provide. The introduction of a new category of duties to facilitate
is best explained as reflecting the recognition that the extent to which
human rights are fulfilled depends on the totality of background conditions
prevailing in a society. Some of these background conditions are subject to
human modification only in minor ways or very slowly or not at all. But
the effect of even these conditions is not preordained but rather shaped by
other background conditions that are very much under human control. Of
greatest importance here is the way the state structures and organizes a
society. For example, the structure of a society's economy profoundly
affects the distribution of income and wealth; the way its criminal justice
system is organized greatly influences what dangers citizens face from
criminal activities; and the design of its education system makes a large
difference to the opportunities various groups of citizens have to
participate effectively in the political process and to defend their legal
rights. Badly organized societies pose massive threats to the objects of their
members' human rights. In response to these threats, one can impress
upon the governing elites, and perhaps upon other citizens as well, the
importance of their duties to respect, protect, and provide. But such
appeals are of limited usefulness in a society in which members of the elite
can embezzle with impunity or in which citizens who work to protect the
rights of fellow citizens are persecuted as disloyal or treasonous and
subjected to arbitrary beatings and detentions by organizations whose
status and legal basis remains shrouded in secrecy. What such a society
needs is structural reform: reorganization. 17
16. General Comment 12, supra note 8.
17. General Comment 12 could surely have stated this point more clearly - but then,
some lack of clarity is perhaps understandable in a document submitted to states (or States, as
they like to be called) for their approval. In the text, I am offering what I see as the most
charitable interpretation of what the authors had in mind when they added this category. But
nothing is lost for the argument of this piece if this conjecture about their thoughts turns out to
be incorrect. What matters for the purpose at hand is the plausibility of the substantive point
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Duties to facilitate constitute then a crucial addition which highlights
the vital importance that the design of institutional arrangements has for
the fulfillment of human rights. This importance is overlooked on a purely
interactional understanding of human rights fulfillment which can,
somewhat simplistically, be put as follows: 1) Human rights would be
universally fulfilled if all human agents complied with their duties to
respect; 2) regrettably, some human agents do not do this and their
disposition to violate human rights triggers duties to protect; 3)
unfortunately, the willingness or ability of human agents to comply with
their duties to protect is insufficient to deter and prevent all breaches of
duties to respect; 4) this fact, along with the occurrence of natural disasters
which may also undermine human rights fulfillment, triggers duties to
provide, that is, duties to help people overcome impediments that obstruct
or render insecure their access to the objects of their human rights.18
The purely interactional analysis of human rights deficits must then be
complemented by an institutional analysis which traces such deficits back
not to wrongful conduct of individual and collective human agents, but to
injustice in the design of social institutions: in the rules and procedures,
roles and agencies that structure and organize societies and other social
systems. The two kinds of analysis are often complementary. Thus, each
instance of slavery is the responsibility of one or more human agents who
(typically with violence or intimidation) subject a human being to their
domination; and the persistence of slavery on a massive scale is the
responsibility of unjust social institutions such as (in the bad old days) the
legal protection of property rights in persons and (in the supposedly
enlightened present) the massive reproduction of life-threatening poverty
and the effective non-recognition by national criminal justice systems of the
human rights of poor foreigners from countries outside the "First World." 19
Similarly, each marital rape is a moral crime committed by a husband; and
persistent high prevalence of marital rape exhibits institutional injustice in
legislation as well as in the training of police and judicial officers.
attributed to the authors rather than the plausibility of this attribution. General Comment 12,
supra note 8.
18. Such an account of "waves of duties" is suggested in Jeremy Waldron, Rights in
Conflict, 99 ETHICS 503, 510 (1989). It is then picked up by Henry Shue in the 1996
Afterword to his BASIC RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 156. But both authors are aware of the
importance for human rights fulfillment of attention to the design and reform of institutional
arrangements - as cited above, Shue lists a category of duties to protect from deprivation by
designing institutions that avoid the creation of strong incentives to violate duties to avoid
depriving. For further discussion, see also Thomas Pogge, Shue on Rights and Duties, in
GLOBAL BASIC RIGHTS 113 (Charles Beitz & Robert Goodin eds., 2009); Kieran Donaghue,
Human Rights, Development INGOs and Priorities for Action, in ETHICAL QUESTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL NGOs: AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN PHILOSOPHERS AND NGOs 39 (Keith Horton &
Chris Roche eds., 2010).
19. Though precise figures are not available, the number of slaves today is commonly
estimated to be around 27 million. "There are more slaves today than were seized from Africa
in four centuries of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. The modern commerce in humans rivals
illegal drug trafficking in its global reach - and in the destruction of lives." Andrew Cockburn,
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Contrasting with these cases of complementarity, there are also many
cases where institutional analysis reaches beyond interactional analysis and
thus enables intelligent responses to human rights deficits that, on a purely
interactional analysis, remain elusive. Poverty is an example of this. When
people are too poor to meet securely their basic needs, then there are
sometimes specific others who have caused this poverty. Hunger may be
due to an increase in local food prices caused by a large local landowner
switching his production from foodstuffs to ethanol - or it may be due to
corrupt politicians throwing poor peasants off their land to make room for
a casino or shopping center. Obvious failures to fulfill duties to provide
may also be in play. But most typically hunger is systemic: arising in the
context of some economic order from the effects of the conduct of many
market participants who cannot foresee how their decisions, together with
those of many others, will affect specific individuals or even the overall
incidence of severe poverty. While it is straightforward what husbands
must not do in order to respect their wives' human right to physical
security, it is not straightforward and may in fact be unknowable what
market participants must not do to respect others' human right to an
adequate standard of living. This human right can best be realized through
suitable socioeconomic institutions, and it was in fact appropriate
institutional design that led to the realization of this right in the countries
where it is realized. 20
While institutional analysis with a moral purpose goes back a long
way,21 its recent exemplar is John Rawls's great work A Theory of Justice.22
While focusing on social institutions and more specifically on the basic
structure of a national society existing under modern conditions, this
work's normative message is addressed to the citizens of such a national
society, offering to explicate for them their "natural duty of justice" which,
Rawls believes, "requires us to support and to comply with just institutions
that exist and apply to us . . . [and] to further just arrangements not yet
established."23 His argument for such a natural duty of justice is important
in highlighting how the members of a society can institutionally address
socio-economic deprivations and inequality even when it is very difficult or
impossible to effectively address them through individual efforts toward
protection or provision. But Rawls's formulation of the argument also
involves (what I regard as) a serious and highly influential flaw, namely the
unthinking presupposition that citizens' duties with regard to the social
institutions they are involved in designing or upholding are one and all
positive duties. In an elaborate mapping exercise, Rawls explicitly
20. The word "realize" is used in the sense of "fulfill for all." A human right is fully
realized in some jurisdiction, or in the world at large, just in case all human beings in this
jurisdiction, or in the world, have secure access to its object.
21. For an important milestone in the Anglophone discussion see JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MVORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds.,
Clarendon Press 1996) (1789).
22. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
23. Id. at 115; see also id., at 246, 334.
14 [Vol. 14:2
14
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 14 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol14/iss2/1
2011] Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World's Poor?
characterizes our natural duties in regard to institutional design as positive
duties, likening them to other positive duties such as those of mutual aid
and mutual respect, while contrasting them with negative duties such as
those not to injure and not to harm the innocent. 24 If citizens' duty to look
after the justice of their shared social institutions is a positive one, then it is
of lesser import - on the widely shared assumption, reiterated by Rawls,
that "when the distinction is clear, negative duties have more weight than
positive ones." 25
Political thinkers and jurists writing after Rawls have unquestioningly
accepted his view that the responsibility for the justice of social institutions
is a positive responsibility, without recognizing that the adoption and
incorporation of this view is a contestable decision of some consequence.
So this responsibility is now everywhere cast in purely positive terms.
General Comment 12 demands that "the State must pro-actively engage in
activities intended to strengthen people's access to and utilization of
resources and means to ensure their livelihood, including food security." 26
And Henry Shue's complex formulation also turns out to be a positive one:
casting our relevant responsibility as one to design institutions that avoid
the creation of strong incentives to violate human rights - rather than one
not to design or uphold social institutions that create strong incentives to
violate human rights.
The problem here is not with the scope of the duty: Rawls and his
successors are not failing to call on citizens to do something that they ought
to be doing. The problem is with the character of the duty and the weight it
is assigned. On the now conventional view, a society's social institutions
have important effects on the lives of its members, and the government and
the citizenry therefore ought to improve these institutions so as to promote
their justice (Rawls) or rights fulfillment (Shue). But this positive duty to
help improve the justice of social institutions sustains no principled
differentiation between the social institutions of one's own society and
those of any other society. A Turk's obligation to promote the justice of
Turkey's social institutions is on a par with her obligation to promote the
justice of Paraguay's social institutions. To be sure, it will often be true that
citizens will be more effective when they focus their time and resources on
improving the institutions of their own society - just as they will typically
be more effective when they discharge their duty to aid the needy in their
own country rather than abroad. Many would add to this that one's
positive duties are more stringent toward people who are culturally and
geographically closer to oneself, with the implication that, even when cost-
effectiveness is equal, one has a weightier moral reason to help a
compatriot than a distant stranger and weightier moral reason also to
promote the institutional justice of one's own society (which would benefit
some of one's compatriots) than to promote the institutional justice of some
24. Id. at109.
25. Id. at114.
26. General Comment 12, supra note 8.
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distant society (which would benefit faraway strangers). Giving full weight
to these two considerations, the conventional view can then reaffirm the
common creed that - even if it is generally cheaper to promote the justice
of Paraguay's social institutions than Turkey's - Turks should normally
focus their efforts to promote social justice upon the social institutions of
Turkey rather than those of Paraguay.
This way of thinking can be criticized, but my interest here is in
complementing it. The point can be introduced with a dramatic analogy.
Imagine a driver who encounters a badly hurt child by the side of the road.
Being a local, the driver knows the area well and knows, in particular, how
to get the boy quickly to the nearest emergency room. She can see that the
boy is bleeding profusely, so that her failure to drive him there may well
cost him his life. Having exchanged a few words with the boy, she also
knows that he lives nearby and thus is geographically and culturally close
to herself. Given all these facts, her duty to aid human beings in need
generates a stringent obligation to drive the boy to the hospital as quickly
as she safely can.
Let us now add another detail to the story, namely that it was the
driver herself who caused the boy's condition: engrossed in an intense cell
phone conversation, she hit the boy after seeing him too late and then lost
more precious time getting her right hand back on the steering wheel. This
new information does not affect the initial conclusion that she has a
weighty obligation to assist by quickly driving the boy to the hospital. But
this conclusion is now overshadowed by an even weightier moral reason: if
what she does in the next few minutes does not succeed in getting the boy's
life saved, then she will have killed (rather than merely injured) him. Her
negative duty not to kill thus generates another, even more stringent
obligation of identical content: she must drive the boy to the hospital as fast
as she safely can.
The key point of the analogy is then that the citizens of a society
generally have two obligations to work toward making its social
institutions more just. One of these derives from their quite general
positive duty to promote the justice of social institutions for the sake of
safeguarding the rights and needs of human beings anywhere. The other
obligation derives from their negative duty not to collaborate in designing
or imposing unjust social institutions upon other human beings. In regard
to a citizen's home society, the content of these two obligations is
essentially the same. But they differ in stringency. Other things equal, it is
worse to let an injustice persist if one is complicit in it than if one is merely
an uninvolved bystander. If the injustice manifests itself in human rights
deficits, then one is a human rights violator in the first case but not in the
second. And this provides an additional, stronger, and non-instrumental
rationale for why typical Turkish citizens should focus their political reform
efforts on Turkey in preference to Paraguay. If Turkey is so organized that
some human rights avoidably remain widely unfulfilled among the
Kurdish minority, then such Turkish citizens are participants in a human
rights violation. By contrast, they are not similarly implicated when
16 [Vol. 14:2
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Paraguay is so organized that some human rights avoidably remain widely
unfulfilled among Paraguay's indigenous people.27
General Comment 12 is right to recognize that the fulfillment of human
rights is greatly affected by social institutions. It is right to acknowledge
the important duties human agents have in regard to the design of social
institutions by breaking out duties to facilitate as a separate category. To
this must be added, however, another separate category of duties not to
collaborate in the design or imposition of social institutions that foreseeably
and avoidably cause human rights to be unfulfilled. These duties are close
to duties to facilitate in regard to the focus on social institutions and the
related purpose of reducing human rights deficits through institutional
reform. They are close to duties to respect in regard to their essentially
negative character: it is only by breaching duties to respect or duties not to
collaborate that one can become a violator of human rights.
D. Human Rights Violation as a Relational Predicate and the Duty to
Facilitate
As the foregoing discussion brings out, the concept of a human rights
violation is a relational predicate, involving specific responsibilities by
particular human agents in regard to unfulfilled human rights of persons.
When many among Paraguay's indigenous population are unable to attain
an adequate standard of living, then this may indicate a human rights
violation on the part of Paraguay's political and economic elite insofar as
they are collaborating in the imposition of unjust social institutions in
Paraguay and also insofar as they are abusing their indigenous servants or
employees. The same human rights deficit indicates no human rights
violation but merely a breach of positive duty on the part of an affluent
citizen of Turkey who - even if he leaves undone things he could easily do
toward protecting, providing, or facilitating secure access by indigenous
Paraguayans to the objects of their human rights - is not involved in
abusing them or in designing or imposing upon them unjust social
institutions. And the same human rights deficit may not indicate any
breach of duty on the part of impoverished citizens of Sierra Leone or
indeed of most of Paraguay's indigenous people themselves - the former
are simply unable to improve the living conditions of indigenous
Paraguayans and the latter cannot reasonably be said to be morally
required to undertake political action toward realizing their own and each
other's human rights when such action would be excessively risky and
costly for them.
Two central points have here been made about the notion of a human
rights violation. One is a call to resist the tendency to deflate the term
"human rights violation" by using it in a broad sense so that it covers all
27. I am here leaving aside the possibility that Turkish citizens may be implicated, through
their government, in the design or imposition of unjust supranational institutional
arrangements that contribute to the human rights deficit in Paraguay. This possibility will be
extensively explored in Part III.
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cases, or all avoidable cases, of unfulfilled human rights. If possible, the
expression should be saved from the political preachers and media
windbags ever in search of stronger expressions to show that they care
more than the rest. Human rights violations are not tragic events, like the
destruction of a town by a meteorite, nor even culpable failures to give
enough aid or protection. Human rights violations are crimes actively
committed by particular human agents who should be identified and then
be persuaded to change their ways or else stopped.
The other point is that human rights violations come in two varieties,
one of which has (unsurprisingly) been overlooked. There is the
interactional variety, where individual or collective human agents do
things that, as they intend, foresee, or should foresee, will avoidably
deprive human beings of secure access to the objects of their human rights.
And there is the institutional variety, where human agents design and
impose institutional arrangements that, as they intend, foresee, or should
foresee, will avoidably deprive human beings of secure access to their
human rights. 28 That the latter variety is overlooked among those who
enjoy the privilege of theorizing about justice and human rights is related to
the fact that its recognition would bring into full view a large crime against
28. In my book World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, I
developed an institutional understanding of human rights but regrettably overstated my case.
Crucial for my argument was the idea that agents can violate human rights by contributing to
the design or imposition of institutional arrangements that foreseeably cause avoidable human
rights deficits. This idea is essential for a plausible assignment of responsibility for many
human rights deficits in the modern era, which are among the largest of human history.
THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND
REFORMS, ch. 2 (2002). But I did not need, and should not have argued for, the rejection of the
interactional understanding of human rights. There was no need to deny that agents can
violate human rights in ways other than through their contributions to designing or upholding
institutional arrangements. I have since recognized this mistake and apologized for it in my
response to Rowan Cruft in a symposium on the book, and so can simply reproduce this
apology here (from Pogge, supra note 3, at 65-66):
At the core of my book is the view that the human rights of others impose
upon us a negative duty "not to cooperate in the imposition of a coercive
institutional order that avoidably leaves human rights unfulfilled without making
reasonable efforts to aid its victims and to promote institutional reform" (p. 170; see
also pp. 70, 144 [WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS]). The human rights of
others may impose further duties upon us, positive or negative ones, but my
argument is meant to avoid any commitment, one way or the other, with regard to
such duties.
It goes against this ecumenical spirit, and therefore was a mistake of mine, to
have written: "In proposing this institutional understanding, I reject its
interactional alternatives: I deny, for instance, that postulating that persons have a
human right to X is tantamount to asserting that some or all individual and
collective human agents have a moral duty - in addition to any legal duties they
may have in their society - not to deny X to others or to deprive them of X" (p. 65
[WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS]). This mistake may have helped to mislead
Cruft, and I apologize for it. I stand by my defense of an institutional
understanding of human rights. But I do not want to deny (or assert) that human
rights also impose positive or negative interactional duties. Taking a position on
this matter is unnecessary for the book's argument and hence best avoided.
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humanity that is now going on and in which these theorists and their
readers are involved. This crime is the design and imposition of unjust
supranational institutional arrangements that foreseeably and avoidably
cause at least half of all severe poverty which in turn is by far the greatest
contributor to the current global human rights deficit.
Consciously or unconsciously, normative theorists obscure this crime in
two main ways. The traditional approach is to present national borders as
moral watersheds. Each state is responsible for the fulfillment of human
rights in its territory, and the responsibility of foreign actors is limited to (at
most) a positive duty of assistance.29
An emerging alternative to the traditional approach might be called the
contemporary approach. Its emergence and success owes much to the
phenomenon of globalization. Transforming the traditional realm of
international relations, one central component of globalization has been the
creation of an increasingly dense and influential global system of rules
along with a proliferating set of new international, supranational, and
multinational actors. These transnational rules and actors reach deep into
the domestic life of (especially the poorer) national societies by shaping and
regulating not only the ever-growing share of interactions that traverse
national borders, but increasingly also purely domestic interactions. In
view of the evidently profound effects that these transnational rules and
actors have on the lives of human beings worldwide, it has become ever
more palpably untenable to claim for them a morality-free zone in which
the concept of justice has no application.3 o So the contemporary approach
does the next best thing by acknowledging a duty to facilitate the realization
of human rights. In addition to positive duties to contribute to the remedial
protection and provision of missing objects of human rights, agents are
now assigned the additional duty to promote the realization of human
rights through the improvement of institutional arrangements. As with the
other two positive duties, this new duty is understood as "imperfect,"
leaving its bearers nearly unlimited discretion over what and how much
they will do. From there it is only a small step to the position the United
States set forth in an "Interpretative Statement" it issued in regard to the
Rome Declaration on World Food Security: "the attainment of any 'right to
food' or 'fundamental right to be free from hunger' is a goal or aspiration to
be realized progressively that does not give rise to any international
obligations."31
The contemporary approach represents a step forward in its
acknowledgement that the proliferating supranational institutional
architecture is neither causally nor morally neutral. But by assigning us, in
regard to these supranational institutional arrangements, an open-ended
29. Rawls exemplified this traditional view with the recognition of such a positive duty of
assistance. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 37, 106-19 (1999).
30. This was done done, in the wake of Rawls, by Thomas Nagel. Thomas Nagel, The
Pro blem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. No. 2, 113 (2005).
31. World Food Summit, Nov. 13-17, 1996, Report of the World Food Summnit, Annex II, U.N.
Doc. WFS 96/REP, available at http://www.fao.org/wfs/.
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task of improvement, the contemporary approach presents this
responsibility as exclusively positive and thereby reinforces a central
doctrine of the traditional approach: the only way foreigners can violate
human rights is through violent cross-border intervention. Though
recognizing that our design of supranational institutions has important
effects on human rights fulfillment worldwide, the contemporary approach
still hides the possibility that this supranational order is fundamentally
unjust. This possibility is important. For if the existing system of
supranational institutional arrangements is fundamentally unjust, then
"progressive improvement" ceases to be a sufficient response. There was a
time when people talked about the improvement of slavery - about
legislative changes that might facilitate more tolerable living conditions by
curbing rapes, beatings, and splitting of families, by reducing back-
breaking labor, and by guaranteeing minimally adequate food, shelter, and
leisure time. But as slavery came to be recognized as fundamentally unjust,
the only adequate response to it was abolition. An institutional injustice is
not something to be gradually ameliorated at one's leisure. It is to be
eliminated through institutional reforms with all deliberate speed pursuant
to a negative duty (on the part of the citizens of the antebellum United
States and on the part of us now) not to impose unjust social institutions
and, in particular, ones that foreseeably give rise to a reasonably avoidable
human rights deficit. In this regard, severe poverty and slavery are on a
par: when social institutions avoiding these deprivations are reasonably
possible, then the imposition of social institutions that perpetuate these
deprivations constitutes a violation of the human rights of those who are
enslaved or impoverished.
III. WE ARE VIOLATING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE WORLD'S POOR: THE
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
On the background of the understanding of human rights violations
presented in Part II, we may now turn to the question of whether we are
indeed violating the human rights of the world's poor. The answer is yes.
There exists a supranational institutional regime that foreseeably produces
massive and reasonably avoidable human rights deficits. By collaboratively
imposing this severely unjust institutional scheme, we are violating the
human rights of the world's poor.
Section II.D has shown how normative theorists sustain this injustice by
allowing no space in their catalogues of duties for a negative duty not to
collaborate (that is, immediately to stop collaborating) in the imposition of
unjust institutional arrangements. This Part will show how empirical
theorists sustain the injustice by arguing that globalization is good for the
poor (Section A) and that the causes of the poverty that remains today are
domestic to the societies in which it persists (Section B). The Part concludes
with some thoughts about what we ought to do in light of the actual causes
of global poverty (Section C).
It may be useful to precede the discussion with a brief reminder of the
20 [Vol. 14:2
20
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 14 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol14/iss2/1
2011] Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World's Poor?
state of human rights fulfillment today. About half of all human beings live
in severe poverty and about a quarter live in extreme or life-threatening
poverty. They appear in statistics such as the following: 925 million people
are chronically undernourished, 32 884 million lack access to improved
drinking water,33 2.5 billion lack access to improved sanitation,34 and almost
2 billion lack regular access to essential medicines.35 Over 1 billion lack
adequate shelter,36 1.6 billion lack electricity,37 796 million adults are
illiterate,38 and 215 million children are child laborers. 39 About one third of
all human deaths, 18 million each year, are due to poverty-related causes. 40
A. Is Globalization Good for the Poor?
One way of disputing the claim that we are violating the human rights
of the poor is by arguing that, because the percentage of very poor people
has been declining (the first Millennium Development Goal, MDG-1, is
phrased in these terms), globalization and the supranational institutional
arrangements it has brought must be good for the poor. This argument
employs an invalid inference. The relevant standard is not whether the lot
of the poor has improved in the past quarter century of globalization, but
rather whether there was not some knowably feasible alternative path of
globalization, evolving some alternative scheme of supranational
institutions, which would have led to a much smaller human rights deficit
at the end of that period. If there is some such feasible alternative scheme,
then we are violating the human rights of the poor by imposing upon them
the current institutional arrangements. By analogy, suppose someone
denied that the institutional order authorizing and enforcing black slavery
in the United States in 1845 violated the human rights of slaves by pointing
out that the proportion of slaves within the U.S. population (or even the
absolute number of slaves) had been shrinking, that the nutritional
situation of slaves had steadily improved, and that brutal treatment, such
32. 925 Million in Chronic Hunger Worldwide, U.N. FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. (Sept. 13, 2010),
http://www.fao.org/news/story/jp/item/45210/icate/.
33. New UNICEF Study Shows MDGs for Children Can Be Reached Faster with Focus on Most
Disadvantaged, UNICEF (Sept. 7, 2010), www.unicef.org/media/media_55913.html.
34. What We Do: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/wash/
(last modified July 6, 2010).
35. World Health Org. [WHO], WHO Medicines Strategy: Countries at the Core - 2004-2007,
at 3, WHO Doc. WHO/EDM/2004.5 (2004), available at http://apps.who.int/
medicinedocs/pdf/s5416e/s5416e.pdf.
36. U.N. Human Settlements Programme, The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human
Settlements 2003, at XXV, U.N. Doc HS/686/03E (2003), available at
http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listitemDetails.aspx?publicationlD=1156.
37. Our Work: Urban Energy, U.N. HABITAT, http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid
=2884&catid=356&typeid=24&subMenuld=0 (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
38. Literacy Topic, UNESCO INST. FOR STATISTICS, http://www.uis.unesco.org/ev
en.php?ID=6401_201&ID2=DOTOPIC (last modified Mar. 29, 2011).
39. Topics: Child Labour, INT'L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/ topics/child-
labour/1ang--en/index.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
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as rape, whipping, and splitting of families, had also been in decline. Let us
stipulate, for the sake of the argument that the worst hardships of slavery
were really continuously declining in these ways. Does this fact weaken, in
any way, the claim that the institution of slavery violated the human rights
of slaves? If the answer is no, then the mere fact that the worst hardships of
poverty have been declining throughout the globalization period cannot
refute the claim that the imposition of the current global institutional order
violates their human rights. The relevant question is not whether and how
much the global human rights deficit has been declining but rather whether
and how much the design of the supranational institutional arrangements
we impose contributes to the human rights deficit that remains.41
Bearing this commonsense standard in mind, let us observe how
various segments of the human population have fared during the
globalization period.42
Richest 5%/( 42.87 46.36 +3.49 +8.1%)/
Next 5% 21.80 22.18 +0.38 +1.7%
Next 15%( 24.83 21.80 -3.03 -12.2%
6.97 6.74 -0.23 -3.3/oQuarter
2.37 2.14 -0.23 -9.7%Quarter
1.16 0.78 -0.38 -32.8/oQuarter
As the table shows, the top five percent of the global income
distribution has gained substantially over the globalization period, while
the poorest eighty percent have lost ground. With the losses most severe in
the poorest quarter, there has been dramatic polarization: in a mere
seventeen years, the ratio between the average income in the top five
41. This paragraph draws on my reply to Matthias Risse in Pogge, Severe Poverty as a
Violation of Negative Duties, supra note 3, at 55-58. For a more extensive discussion of baselines
for assessing institutional harm, see Thomas Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation,
in FREEDOM FROM POVERTY AS A HUMAN RIGHT: WHO OWES WHAT TO THE VERY POOR? 11, 11-
54 (Thomas Pogge ed., 2007). As I will show in a moment, it is questionable whether what I
stipulated in this paragraph is actually true, namely that the worst hardships of poverty have
been declining throughout the globalization period. See infra note 44.
42. These data were kindly supplied by Branko Milanovic of the World Bank in a personal
e-mail communication. See Email from Branko Milanovic, supra note 2.
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percent and that in the poorest quarter has skyrocketed from 185 to 297.
The table also shows that, surprisingly, the world poverty problem - so
unimaginably large in human terms - is tiny in economic terms. In 2005,
the shortfall of the world's poor from an adequate standard of living was
about 2 percent of global household income or 1.2 percent of world income
(the sum of all gross national incomes). 43 This global poverty gap could
have been filled almost twice over, just from the gain in the share of the
richest ventile (one twentieth) during the 1988-2005 period. Given these
facts, it would be very hard indeed to make a good case for the claim that
the massive poverty persisting today was not reasonably avoidable.
With the poorest quarter losing one third of its already absurdly small
share of global household income, it is not surprising that very large
numbers of human beings continue to subsist in extreme poverty, well
below an adequate standard of living. The most credible figures we have
on this front are the numbers of undernourished people as provided by the










What can we conclude from these data in regard to our central
43. This accords roughly with the World Bank's PPP-based tally which counted 3,085
million people as living in severe poverty in 2005 and estimated their collective shortfall - the
global poverty gap - at 1.130% of world income. See POLITICS AS USUAL, supra note 2, at 69.
44. Data mostly from WORLD FOOD PROGRAM AND FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF
FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2010: ADDRESSING FOOD INSECURITY IN PROTRACTED CRISES
(2010), summarized at Hunger, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
www.fao.org/hunger/en/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2011), see also supra note 32. Number of
undernourished in 2008 from FAO and Emergencies, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, www.fao.org/emergencies/tce-home/news/emergency-news/emergency-detail/
0/item/8894/icode/en/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). Percentages for 2008-2010 are calculated
by using figures from HUMAN POPULATION CLOCK, http://galen.metapath.org/popclk.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2011). Counting those living below $1.25 per person per day at 2005
purchasing power parities, the World Bank produces a much prettier extreme poverty trend.
But its calculations depend on several dubious methodological decisions including the use of
inappropriate general household consumption PPPs. For extended discussion, see POLITICS AS
USUAL, supra note 2, ch. 4.
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empirical question of whether a feasible alternative design of supranational
institutional arrangements could have led to a smaller human rights deficit?
While it is certainly possible that there was no such feasible alternative, it is
highly unlikely given the data. For the denial of the possibility of such an
alternative would amount to the wildly implausible claim that there was no
feasible alternative institutional path of globalization that would have
avoided the catastrophic losses in the income share of the poor while still
achieving a reasonable rate of global economic growth.45
The implausibility of this claim becomes even more clear as we reflect
on the strongly antidemocratic and pro-wealthy path that globalization has
taken. Globalization involves the emergence of complex and ever more
comprehensive and influential bodies of supranational law and regulations
that increasingly pre-empt, constrain, and shape national legislation. Such
supranational rules are not formulated through the kind of transparent,
democratic procedures that characterize national law-making in the
countries that have reached a basic level of domestic justice. Rather,
supranational rules largely emerge through intergovernmental negotiations
from which the general public and even the majority of weaker
governments are effectively excluded. Only an unusually small number of
'players' can exert real influence over supranational rule-making: powerful
organizations, prominently including large multinational corporations and
banks, as well as very rich individuals and their associations and the ruling
"elites" of the most powerful developing countries. These richest and most
powerful agents are best positioned to engage in cost-effective lobbying.
They can reap huge gains from favorable supranational rules and therefore
can afford to spend great sums acquiring the necessary expertise, forming
alliances with one another, and lobbying the stronger governments (G7, G8,
and G20) that dominate supranational rule-making. Ordinary citizens, by
contrast, typically find it prohibitively costly to acquire the necessary
expertise and to form alliances that are large enough to rival corporate
influence. In the absence of global democratic institutions, globalization
sidelines the vast majority of human beings, who have no way of
influencing the formulation and application of supranational rules, while
greatly enhancing the rule-shaping powers of a tiny minority of those who
are already the richest and most powerful. (Many of them foresaw this, of
course, and were for this reason among the strongest supporters of the
ongoing globalization push.) Their interests are diverse, and so they are
competing and bargaining with one another - each seeking to shape and
reshape supranational rules to be as favorable as possible to itself. There
are winners and losers in these contests, some elite players fail in their
efforts to shape in their favor the rules that stand to impact them the most.
Yet, the rules do get captured by some elite players and, as a group, they
consequently grow their share of global wealth and expand their advantage
over the rest of humankind. This, in turn, further increases their capacity to
45. For a more extensive discussion, see Thomas Pogge, Responses to the Critics, in THOMAS
POGGE AND HIS CRITICS 175,175-191 (Alison Jaggar ed., 2010).
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influence the design and application of the rules in their own favor and,
unintentionally but no less inexorably, keeps the poorer half of humankind
in dire poverty.
Therefore it is not surprising that the institutional design shift upward,
from the national to the supranational level, is further marginalizing
humanity's poorer majority, who have no way of influencing supranational
negotiations, and is further increasing the absolute and relative wealth and
power of a tiny minority at the top, who can monopolize such influence.
The rapid global polarization of the last 20 years is a foreseeable effect of a
highly undemocratic path of globalization and the regulatory-capture
opportunities it provides.
B. Are the Causes of the Persistence of Poverty Purely Domestic?
Empirical theorists provide a second line of defense of the status quo by
arguing that the causes of the persistence of poverty are domestic to the
societies in which poverty persists. The observed polarization is not one
phenomenon, driven by supranational institutional arrangements, but
rather two phenomena: good progress in well-organized Western countries,
which maintain high levels of social justice and decent rates of economic
growth, and mixed progress in many other countries, which pay little
attention to social justice and whose economic growth is often held back by
a range of local natural, cultural, or political impediments. Two sets of
empirical findings are adduced as evidence for this picture. One is that the
overall gap between affluent and developing countries is no longer
growing, as China and India, in particular, have been maintaining long-
term rates of economic growth that are considerably above those of Europe,
North America, and Japan.46 This is taken to show that supranational rules
are not biased against poor countries and that the main driver of
polarization today is rising intra-national inequality which is under
domestic control and each country's own responsibility.
In response, one might point out that, over the recent globalization
period, only about one quarter of developing countries, and only about a
tenth of the poorest developing countries, had growth in GDP per capita
that exceeded that of the high-income countries as a group.47 But the more
important point is that the increase of intra-national economic inequality in
nearly all countries is no longer under easy domestic control but rather
driven by the increasingly important role that supranational rules play in
constraining and shaping national legislation and in governing domestic
markets for goods, services, labor, and investments.
The influence of supranational rules is in some cases direct and
immediate and in other cases mediated through competition. As an
example of a direct and immediate influence, consider an important part of
46. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE
CHANGE 378-79 (2010).
47. WORLD RES. INSTITUTE, ECONOMICS, BUSINESS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT DATABASE,
http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable db/index.php?theme=5 (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
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the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime, namely the 1994 Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement which
requires WTO members to institute national intellectual property regimes
that award and enforce product patents of at least twenty-year duration on
new medicines and thus suppress the manufacture and sale of competing
generic products. This requirement massively aggravates poverty by
increasing the cost of medicines that poor people, far more vulnerable to
disease, have much greater need for. Often, poor people cannot afford the
medicines they would have been able to buy in the absence of TRIPS and
then spend money on inferior (often counterfeit) products, or else go
without medicine altogether, and suffer chronic disease or even premature
death as a result, with devastating effects on their family's livelihood.48
As an example of the influence of supranational rules mediated by
competition, consider that the WTO Treaty, while mandating open and
competitive global markets, contains no uniform labor standards that
would protect workers from abusive and stressful working conditions,
from absurdly low wages, or from excessive working hours. It thereby
draws poor countries into a vicious "race to the bottom" where they,
competing for foreign investment, must outbid one another by offering ever
more exploitable workforces. Under the conditions of WTO globalization,
workers cannot resist such a deterioration of their terms of employment
because, if they succeed in securing more humane working conditions for
themselves, many of them will end up unemployed as jobs are moved
abroad.
Massive increases in domestic inequality are to be expected, then, in
developing countries. And we do indeed find this phenomenon in nearly
all developing countries for which good data are available, countries as
diverse as Argentina, Bangladesh, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Hungary and Jamaica. 49
China is an especially interesting case, because it contains nearly a fifth
of humanity and is the leading poster child of globalization. During the
1990-2004 period, China reportedly achieved spectacular 236% growth in
per capita gross national income.50 But the same period also saw a stunning
increase in inequality. While the income share of the top tenth rose from
250% to 35%, that of the poorest fifth fell from 7.3% to 4.3%.51 This means
that the ratio of the average incomes of these two groups increased from 6.8
48. See Thomas Pogge, The Health Impact Fund and Its Justification by Appeal to Human Rights,
40 J. OF Soc. PHIL. 4,542 (2009).
49. UNITED NATIONS UNIV. WORLD INSTITUTE FOR DEV. ECON. RESEARCH [UNU-WIDER],
WORLD INCOME INEQUALITY DATABASE V2.0c (May 2008),
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/enGB/database.
50. Calculated from World Bank data by dividing each year's GNI (in current Yuan) by
China's population that year, then using China's GDP deflator to convert into constant 2005
Yuan.
51. Distribution data for 1990 from the World Bank as cited in Camelia Minoiu & Sanjay
Reddy, Chinese Poverty: Assessing tihe Imipact of Alternative Assumptions, 54 REVIEW INCOME &
WEALTH 4, 572, 577, tbl.1 (2008). Distribution data for 2004 is from WORLD BANK, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2008 68, tbl.2.8 (2008) .
26 [Vol. 14:2
26
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 14 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol14/iss2/1
2011] Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World's Poor?
to 16.3 as average income in the top tenth rose by 370% while average
income in the poorest fifth rose by only 980%. To be sure, an income gain of
98% over fourteen years is not bad at all. But China's poor paid a high
price for it in terms of marginalization, humiliation, and oppression by the
emerging economic elite whose greatly expanded share of Chinese
household income gives them much greater opportunities to influence
political decisions, to give unfair advantages to their children, and to
dominate the poor in direct personal interactions. They would have been
much better off with more equal economic growth, even if this would have
been somewhat less rapid.
We find a similar phenomenon in the other leading country of the
twenty-first century, the United States. In line with the Kuznets Curve
hypothesis, the U.S. experienced gradual income equalization from the
beginning of the Great Depression until the beginning of the current
globalization period. Contrary to the Kuznets hypothesis, this period was
followed, however, by a dramatic income polarization that progressed most
rapidly in the 1990s. The nearby table tells the story, and the data from the
Internal Revenue Service (more fine-grained than those available for China)
show, in particular, that the relative gains were heavily concentrated at the
very top, where a mere 400,000 now earn as much as the poorest 150
million. The top 0.01% of U.S. households (ca. 14,400 tax returns)
quadrupled their share of U.S. household income and increased their
advantage in average income over the poorer half of Americans six-fold,
from 375:1 to 2214:1. The top ventile (one twentieth) of the population is
the only one that gained ground; each of the lower 19 ventiles saw its share
of U.S. household income decline, and these relative losses were greatest at
the bottom.52
52. The top five rows of the table present data from Facundo Alvaredo, Tony Atkinson,
Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, WORLD TOP INCOMES DATABASE, http://g-
mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2011). The remaining
three rows present data provided by Mark Robyn & Gerald Prante, Summary of Latest Federal
Individual Income Tax Data, TAX FOUND. tbl.5 (Oct. 6, 2010),
www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/250.html. Because the data come from different
sources, columns 2-4 do not quite sum up correctly. But this should not disturb the table's
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Next 5%o 10.48 11.48 11.39 -0.09 -1/o
This income polarization in the U.S., and the consequent economic and
political marginalization of the U.S. poor, underscore the point that
increasing intra-national inequality is a widespread phenomenon that,
while certainly influenced by domestic factors and resistible by domestic
political processes, is favored and facilitated by the WTO globalization of
the last decades. U.S. polarization can moreover highlight a useful political
point: if the poorest ninety percent of the U.S. population had a better
understanding of their own interests, they would be potential partners in a
coalition aimed at democratizing globalization: aimed at reducing the near-
monopolistic power of a small global elite that is now steering the evolution
of the supranational institutional architecture. To win them as allies we can
appeal to their interests, but also, of course, to their commitment to human
rights which are the core theme of this article. Let me conclude then by
highlighting some of the main features of the present supranational
institutional arrangements that are especially detrimental to the realization
of human rights.
I give this account in opposition to the usual rosy story which, if it
acknowledges the massive persistence of severe poverty at all, explains it
by two factors: corrupt and oppressive regimes in many poor countries and
the 'leaky bucket' of development assistance. Both of these explanations
have an element of truth. But the first fails to explain the high prevalence of
corrupt and oppressive regimes, and the second fails to explain why the
income share of the poor is falling, and rapidly so.
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My own explanation can redeploy the metaphor: the assets of the poor
are like a leaky bucket, continuously depleted by massive outflows that
overwhelm the effects of development assistance, which, in any case, are
puny. We take great pride in our assistance, boasting, for example, of the
billions we spend annually on assistance to poor countries. Yet we ignore
the vastly larger amounts that we extract from the poor without
compensation. Consider the following examples.
First, affluent countries and their firms buy huge quantities of natural
resources from the rulers of developing countries without regard for how
such leaders came to power and how they exercise power. In many cases,
this amounts to collaboration in the theft of these resources from their
owners: the country's people. It also enriches their oppressors, thereby
entrenching the oppression: tyrants sell us the natural resources of their
victims and then use the proceeds to buy the weapons they need to keep
themselves in power.53
Second, affluent countries and their banks lend money to such rulers
and compel the country's people to repay it even after the ruler is gone.
Many poor populations are still repaying debts incurred, against their will,
by dictators such as Suharto in Indonesia, Mobutu in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and Abacha in Nigeria. Again, we are participating
in theft: the unilateral imposition of debt burdens on impoverished
populations.
Third, affluent countries facilitate the embezzlement of funds by public
officials in less developed countries by allowing their banks to accept such
funds. This complicity could easily be avoided: banks are already under
strict reporting requirements with regard to funds suspected of being
related to terrorism or drug trafficking. Yet Western banks still eagerly
accept and manage embezzled funds, with governments ensuring that their
banks remain attractive for such illicit deposits. Global Financial Integrity
(GFI) estimates that less developed countries have in this way lost at least
$342 billion annually during the 2000-2008 period.54
Fourth, affluent countries facilitate tax evasion in the less developed
countries through lax accounting standards for multinational corporations.
Since they are not required to do country-by-country reporting, such
corporations can easily manipulate transfer prices among their subsidiaries
to concentrate their profits where they are taxed the least. As a result, they
may report no profit in the countries in which they extract, manufacture or
sell goods or services, having their worldwide profits taxed instead in some
tax haven where they only have a paper presence. GFI estimates that,
during the 2002-2006 period, trade mispricing deprived less developed
53. See POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 28, ch. 6; Leif Wenar,
Property Rights and the Resource Curse, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2-32 (2008).
54. DEV KAR & KARLY CURCIO, GLOBAL FIN. INTEGRITY, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 2000-2009 (2011). For comparison, official development assistance
during this period averaged $87 billion annually, of which only $9 billion was allocated to
"basic social services." Millenniumi Development Goal Indicators, UNITED NATIONS,
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Search.aspx?q bss%20oda (last visited March 4, 2011).
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countries of $98.4 billion per annum in tax revenues.55
Fifth, affluent countries account for a disproportionate share of global
pollution. Their emissions are prime contributors to serious health hazards,
extreme weather events, rising sea levels, and climate change, to which
poor populations are especially vulnerable. A recent report by the Global
Humanitarian Forum estimated that climate change is already seriously
affecting 325 million people and is annually causing $125 billion in
economic losses, as well as 300,000 deaths, of which 99% are in less
developed countries. 56
Finally, affluent countries have created a global trading regime that is
supposed to release large collective gains through free and open markets.
The regime is rigged; it permits rich states to continue to protect their
markets through tariffs and anti-dumping duties and to gain larger world
market shares through export credits and subsidies (including about $265
billion annually in agriculture alone) that poor countries cannot afford to
match.57 Since production is much more labor-intensive in poor than in
affluent countries, such protectionist measures destroy many more jobs
than they create.
C. What Ought We to Do?
Taken together, these supranational institutional factors generate a
massive headwind against the poor.58 This headwind overwhelms the
effects of public and private foreign aid, perpetuating the exclusion of the
poor from effective participation in the globalized economy and their
inability to benefit proportionately from global economic growth. This
problem may be solvable through huge increases in development aid, but
such continuous compensation is neither cost-effective nor sustainable. It is
far better to develop institutional reforms that would reduce the headwind,
and eventually turn it off. This would mean seeing the world poverty
problem not as a specialist concern at the margins of grand politics but as
an important consideration in all decisions related to institutional design.
The world's leading governments could mainstream the imperative of
poverty avoidance in this way. But Western governments are unlikely to
do this unless there is voter demand or at least voter approval. As of now,
the opposite is the case. Even while the hardships suffered by poor people
are rising (partly as a result of the U.S.-caused Global Financial Crisis),
55. ANN HOLLINGSHEAD, GLOBAL FIN. INTEGRITY, THE IMPLIED TAX REVENUE LOSS FROM
TRADE MISPRICING 15, tbl.2 (2010).
56. GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN FORUM, THE ANATOMY OF A SILENT CRISIS 1, 78 (2009).
57. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV'T, AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN OECD
COUNTRIES 13 (2009).
58. That this headwind is at most weak and uncertain has been forcefully argued by
Cohen. Joshua Cohen, Philosophy, Social Science, Global Poverty, in THOMAS POGGE AND HIS
CRITICS, supra note 45, at 18-45. See also my reply. THOMAS POGGE, Responses to tihe Critics in
THOMAS POGGE AND HIS CRITICS, supra note 45, at 175-250. With luck, this dispute will
stimulate more and better empirical research on what the effects of various supranational
institutional design decisions actually are.
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voters in the United States are putting foreign aid at the bottom of the list of
expenditures to be preserved.59  Voters in Continental Europe are
somewhat more supportive of foreign aid, with voters in Germany, Italy,
France, and Spain holding that more of the needed budget cuts should
come out of the military budget.60 These more supportive voter attitudes
are reflected in higher European outlays for official development assistance
(ODA), which are 0.45% of gross national income versus 0.20% for the
United States. 61 Both rates are far below the Western promise of the 1970s
to bring ODA rates up to 0.70% - a promise that only five small countries
(Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) have been
honoring. It should also be noted that much foreign aid is spent for the
benefit of domestic exporters or "friendly" governments; out of $120 billion
spent annually on ODA, only about $15.5 billion is spent on "basic social
services," that is, on reducing poverty or its effects. 62
Citizen attitudes clearly matter. If citizens of Western states cared
about the avoidance of poverty, then so would their politicians. But an
individual citizen may still feel powerless to change anything and may then
reject any responsibility for the massive persistence of severe poverty. This
rejection clearly could not excuse a majority of citizens. Given the stakes,
the members of such a majority should organize themselves or otherwise
ensure that politicians understand that they must seriously address the
world poverty problem if they want to succeed in politics. But if - as is
actually the case - a large majority of one's fellow citizens is not ready to
prioritize the world poverty problem, then there may indeed be little that a
few willing citizens can do to change their country's policies and posture in
international negotiations about supranational institutional design. Should
citizens in this situation be considered implicated in their country's human
rights violation even if they cannot prevent it?
One might argue for an affirmative answer on the following ground:
such citizens could emigrate to one of the poorer countries, thereby
disconnecting themselves from their erstwhile country's policies and
marginally weakening this country. Emigration may indeed be a plausible
decision in cases of great injustice - it made sense, for instance, for Herbert
Ernst Karl Frahm (the later Willy Brandt) to leave Germany as the Nazis
were consolidating power. But in developed Western societies today,
democratic institutions remain basically intact, and efforts to stir the
59. A recent CNN poll (Jan. 21-23, 2011) found that eighty-one percent of Americans are in
favor of reductions in foreign aid. CNN, OPINION RESEARCH CORPORATION POLL - JAN. 21 TO
23,2011 17 (2011), available at http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2011/images/01/25/rel2d.pdf.
60. Tony Barber, Strong Public Support for Spending Cuts Across Europe, FIN. TIMES, July 12,
2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8f9e61cO-8ce2-lldf-bad7-00144feab49a.html#axzzlFbg
LKgVc (last visited Mar. 4, 2011).
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conscience of one's compatriots are not futile. Moreover, there is a far
better way for citizens to avoid sharing responsibility for the human rights
violations their government is committing in their name. Citizens can
compensate for a share of the harm for which their country is responsible
by, for example, supporting effective international agencies or non-
governmental organizations. Such compensation is a much better option
than emigration for two reasons: it is typically less burdensome for citizens,
and it also reduces the human rights deficit in which these citizens are
implicated. To make room for this compensation option, our human-rights-
correlative negative duty in regard to social institutions should then be
amended. We have a duty not to collaborate in the design or imposition of
social institutions that foreseeably cause a human-rights deficit that is
reasonably avoidable through better institutions - unless we fully
compensate for our fair share of the avoidable human rights deficit.
How might compensation work? Suppose one accepts the earlier
estimate that those lacking an adequate standard of living in 2005 would
have needed another two percent of global household income to reach this
low level of sufficiency. And suppose that your household's per capita
income in 2005 was about $15,000, placing you in the middle of the second
ventile. Since the top two ventiles in 2005 had 68.54% of global household
income, a transfer of 2.9% of their collective income to the poor would have
been theoretically sufficient to eradicate severe poverty. Had you in 2005
reduced the global poverty gap by $435 (2.9% of $15,000), then you would
have been sure to have compensated for your fair share of the harm that
we, through our governments, are collectively imposing on the world's
poor. 63
IV. CONCLUSION
To show that we are indeed violating the human rights of the world's
poor, I have proceeded in two main steps. Part II set forth a conception of
what it means to violate a human right, arguing that "human rights
violation" is a relational predicate, involving right holders as well as duty
bearers, with the latter playing an active role in causing the human rights of
the former to be unfulfilled. Widely neglected is one very common kind of
63. Of course this calculation should be refined in various ways. First, even a just
supranational institutional order, carefully designed toward human rights realization, would
not avoid poverty completely, so we may not be collectively responsible for the entire poverty
gap. Second, some have job-related reasons to live in an area with high prices (especially for
shelter) which may reduce their fair share. Third, some people poorer than we are, those in
the third and fourth ventiles at least, might also be expected to make compensating
contributions, which would slightly dilute our fair share. Fourth, people richer than we are
should be expected to contribute more than a proportional (2.9 %) share of their incomes. You
can easily argue your way down to $300. But in view of the horrendous deprivations suffered
by the world's poor people, in view of the near-universal failure of our peers to make the
required compensating contribution, and in view of our undeserved good fortune to be born
among the privileged (and perhaps to be more privileged than anyone would be under just
institutional arrangements), we have every reason to err on the side of overpayment.
32 [Vol. 14:2
32
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 14 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol14/iss2/1
2011] Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World's Poor?
such violations involving the design and imposition of institutional
arrangements that foreseeably and avoidably cause some human beings to
lack secure access to the objects of their human rights. Just as one is
actively harming people when one takes on the office of lifeguard and then
fails to do one's job, so we are actively harming people when we seize the
authority to design and impose social institutions and then fail to shape
these institutions so that human rights are realized under them insofar as
this is reasonably possible. As argued in Part III, we violate the human
rights of billions of poor people by collaborating in the imposition of a
supranational institutional scheme that foreseeably produces massive and
reasonably avoidable human rights deficits.
It is easy to walk away from this conclusion with the comment that its
empirical support has not been established beyond any doubt. As I
indicated above, it is certainly possible that the global human rights deficit
would have been at least as large as it is under any feasible alternative
design of supranational institutional arrangements. But to live comfortably
with the belief that we have only positive assistance duties toward the
world's poor, we need more than a slight doubt of my conclusion. This is
especially true in light of the amazing lack of serious unbiased inquiry into
the effects of existing global institutional arrangements. Are we going to
tell the poor majority of our contemporaries that, as we have not carefully
examined the causal effects of the institutional arrangements we are (in
collaboration with their ruling elites) imposing on the world, we cannot be
certain that these arrangements are doing massive avoidable harm - and
that we may therefore reject as insufficiently corroborated the claim that we
are violating their human rights? With a lot of evidence supporting the
claim that supranational institutional arrangements we are involved in
imposing contribute greatly to the persistence of the huge current human
rights deficit, we ought to press for more careful study of these
arrangements and their effect and for feasible reforms that make these
arrangements more protective of the poor. Each of us should also do
enough toward protecting poor people to be confident that one is fully
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